An Open Letter to Hon’ble President

To
Shri Ram Nath Kovind
Hon'ble President of India
Rashtrapati Bhavan
New Delhi–110001

Through Secretary to the President
Date: August 1, 2017

Subject : National security and integrity under threat from Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR) of 12-digit biometric data based Unique Identification (UID)/Aadhaar Numbers of Indian residents
Respected Rashtrapati Jee,

Greetings from Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties (CFCL)!

We wish you an illustrious tenure as 14th President of India. This is to seek your urgent attention towards citizens' opposition to the Central Identities Data Repository (CIDR) of 12-digit biometric data based Unique Identification (UID)/Aadhaar Numbers of Indian residents. It is linked to more than a century old world famous 'Satyagraha' of Mahatma Gandhi in order to oppose the identification scheme of the government in South Africa. On 22nd August, 1906, the South African government published a draft Asiatic Law Amendment Ordinance. The Ordinance required all Indians in the Transvaal region of South Africa, eight years and above, to report to the Registrar of Asiatics and obtain, upon the submission of a complete set of fingerprints, a certificate which would then have to be produced upon demand. The move proposed stiff penalties, including deportation, for Indians who failed to comply with the terms of the Ordinance. Knowing the impact of the Ordinance and effective criminalisation of the entire community, Mahatma Gandhi then decided to challenge it. Calling the Ordinance a 'Black Act' he mobilised around 3,000 Indians in Johannesburg who took an oath not to submit to a degrading and discriminatory piece of legislation. Biometric UID/Aadhaar case demonstrates how 'Those who forget history are condemned to repeat it'.

We wish to draw your attention towards a chapter titled "On the Map: Making Surveillance Work" under the section Revolutions in the International Monetary System in the book Silent Revolution: The International Monetary Fund 1979-1989, IMF commiserates with the lesser mortals stating that it knows that 'surveillance' does sound terrible. The chapter in the book, which was published by the IMF in 2001, deals with the principles and procedures of surveillance. IMF is part of the World Bank Group which is repeatedly being cited approvingly before the 9-Judge Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court by the Attorney General of India in the course of the hearing underway in Writ Petition (Civil) 494 of 2012. World Bank was cited today as well on several occasions. IMF admits that: "Surveillance, a central pillar of IMF activities and responsibilities in the modern era, is not an easy concept to grasp." It will have us accept that only the heads of public institutions can grasp and communicate the meaning of 'surveillance'.

It may be noted that Jacob A Frenkel, an IMF official is quoted in the book. He argues that the word 'surveillance' should be made to sound benign. It "should give way to concepts of cooperation, partnership, and consultation; of bringing on board the rest of the world's considerations." This publication states, "In practice, surveillance has encapsulated all of the above notions, but at its best it has been motivated by and has itself promoted a spirit of international cooperation."

This publication informs that the first official use of the term came in June 1974. IMF was concerned that "Few, if any countries, however, were prepared to be subjected to surveillance in that strong sense. The 1980s therefore became a decade of experimentation, in which the staff and management of the Fund constantly probed and prodded to see how far they could go in persuading countries to respond positively to Fund analysis and advice."

This IMF publication states, "If surveillance was to have any substance, the Fund would have to develop that influence: through the power of persuasion (Fund management and staff to country authorities), through peer pressure (country to country in the forum of the Fund), and through publicity (Fund to the public). The relative merit of each of these channels was always the subject of much debate. Was publicity appropriate, or would it conflict with and even nullify the benefits of persuasion and peer pressure?"

IMF asks itself, "Did surveillance mean that the IMF was expected to be a financial Interpol, seeking out and punishing errant behavior, or should its role be more that of a faithful confidant of those entrusted with implementing macroeconomic policies around the world?" Have most public institutions in India become "a faithful confidant" of World Bank Group? We submit that there is a revelation in the publication that IMF is concerned with the "viability of military spending" as well. IMF took a formal position on the role of military spending in national economic policy in October 1991. At that time, executive directors concluded that, "as military expenditure can have an important bearing on a member's fiscal policy and external position, information about such expenditure may be necessary to permit a full and internally consistent assessment of the member's economic position and policies". If this is not an exercise in surveillance, which admittedly sounds 'terrible', what else is it?

We submit that the old maxim, 'if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear' has been given a very public burial in digital age. This has been thoroughly debunked. This myth is attributed to Nazi propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels. Database State, a report from the UK states, 'In October 2007, Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (Department) lost two discs containing a copy of the entire child benefit database.' Only blind faith in a Utopian State can persuade people to think that they have nothing to fear after trusting their personal sensitive information to a 'Database State'.

We submit that authorities have failed to appreciate that several countries including the US, the UK, Australia, China, Canada and Germany have tried such projects but aborted them midway. Biometric profiling based identification schemes like UID/Aadhaar are inherently dangerous because it tracks individuals based on their religious, behavioural and/or biological traits. History is replete with examples wherein such profiling has been used for genocide, holocaust and violence against all kinds of minorities. The promoters of biometric UID/Aadhaar Number are promoting digital caste system and digital racism. Mr Jacob Appelbaum, computer security researcher, hacker, activist, and a spokesperson for WikiLeaks has warned, biometric Aadhaar/"UID will create a digital caste system because going by the way it is now being implemented, if you choose not to be part of the system, you will be the modern-day equivalent of an outcast. In theory, you are supposed to have the freedom to choose but in reality, the choice will only be whether to be left out and left behind".

We submit that the operation model overview for the Aadhaar authentication indicates that there is no provision to verify the written consent of any person to share biometric information. "Before implementing any biometric application, the Army must undertake a thorough legal analysis of exactly what it wants to do and where it wants to do it" concluded John D Woodward, Jr et al in ‘Legal Assessment : Legal concerns’ raised by the US Army's Use of Biometrics published by RAND Corporation. This implies that besides application in defence, the civilian and defence application of biometric profiling in India also merits legal attention. As a consequence, biometric profiling for UID/Aadhaar is indeed a big deal.

We submit that in the meanwhile, Secretary Department of Defence Production, Union Ministry of Defence has been asked to introduce Aadhaar enabled Biometric Attendance System in the department of defence production. The system would enable an employee with an Aadhaar number to register his/her attendance (arrival/departure) in the office through biometric authentication. It also says that a web based application software system will enable online recording of attendance and that the dash board relating to real time attendance and related statistics, can be viewed by everyone.

We submit that the proposal of application of biometric UID/Aadhaar was initially restricted to 'civilian application' and was not meant for defence application. Central Government's Biometrics Standards Committee had categorically stated that UID/Aadhaar's is meant only for "civilian application" but the order on Aadhaar enabled biometric attendance system has been extended to defence employees as well. The fact remains UID was first adopted by USA's Department of Defence. It has subsequently been pushed through World Bank's etransform Initiative in partnership with France, South Korea, Gemalto, IBM, L1, Microsoft, Intel and Pfizer. L1 was a US a company when it got a contract from UIDAI but it got purchased by French Conglomerate Safran Group after security clearance by US Government. This constitutes breach of national security as no such clearance was granted by Government of India. Some of these companies have partnership with Chinese Government as well. The entire information of the employees working in the department of defence production, which will include related statistics, will be stored online and on cloud will be available to everybody. Besides application of UID/Aadhaar in the Department of defence production not being in national interest making it available to everyone and on the cloud, including to the foreign companies like Safran Group, its L1 Solutions, Accenture and Ernst & Young will violate the order of Hon'ble Court.

It is evident that the coverage of defence employees under UID/Aadhaar enabled Biometric Attendance System does establish conclusively that it UID/Aadhaar is being put to defence application contrary to the claim of the government. There is a logical compulsion for withdrawing the letter and all consequential letters by which UID/Aadhaar is made applicable to defence application i.e. Department of Defence Production in the interest of supreme national security.

We submit that biometric profiling is inherently dangerous because it tracks individuals based on their religious, behavioural and/or biological traits. History is replete with examples wherein such profiling has been used for genocide, holocaust and violence against all kinds of minorities.

We submit that colonial powers had suspect identification offices in Egypt and Bengal, India after the development of biometric identification by Sir Francis Galton, an English eugenicist who supported slavery. ‘In Imprint of Raj : How Fingerprinting was born in Colonial India’ (2003), Chandak Sengoopta reveals how biometric identification technique was fine-tuned by the Bengal Police. Eugenics and slavery has long been abandoned, the scientific claims of biometrics too have been found to be dubious by reputed institutions.

We submit that the word 'surveillance' is being made to sound benign as desired by international financial institutions and irresponsible officials and former officials.

We submit that linking of biometric Unique Identification (UID)/Aadhaar number to all public services is designed to cause "civil death". Civil death is the loss of all or almost all civil rights by a person caused by the government of a country. It is clear that denial of rights in the absence of UID/Aadhaar is an act of coercion that would lead to civil death, this tantamounts to normalisation of cruelty towards Indian residents. It creates a compelling logic for scrapping of the biometric identification exercise.

We submit that millions of citizens are to be denied their rights because of UID/Aadhaar because the Aadhaar Act makes access to many essential and other public services contingent on UID/Aadhaar. It is already evident that making it compulsory in food distribution in some states has excluded many needy and deserving citizens without cause. We submit that the Aadhaar Act allows for unprecedented surveillance of every citizen and massive denial of fundamental rights. These can be used by governments at different levels to target political opponents and dissidents, as well as others. It enables sharing of personal sensitive information of Indian residents with private foreign companies. It renders all Indians vulnerable to identity theft, fraud, cyber-piracy, data breaches and other uses of their personal data with very serious security implications.

We submit that it is possible that such civilian and non-civilian applications are being bulldozed by some commercial entities in order to store and read biometric and DNA script of Indian population in the aftermath of the sequencing of Human Genome for epigenetics, medicine, big data, social control, inheritance, eugenics and genetic determinism.

Now that the Constitution Bench has recognized the urgency of the issue in question, we seek your attention to persuade the Hon'ble Court to ponder over the following questions:
l    Will foreign companies like Ernst & Young, Safran, L1 Identities Solution and Accenture that admittedly work with US security and intelligence agencies who were awarded contracts on 30 July, 2010 for implementation of Aadhaar/UID Number protect US national interest or India's national interest in the aftermath of Patriot Act taking cognisance of disclosures by Shri Edward Snowden and Wikileaks?
l    The manifesto titled "2083: A European Declaration of Independence" brought out by Norwegian gunman and neo-Crusader, Anders Behring Breivik who carried out the heinous attacks on his fellow citizens is actually a unique identity manifesto as well. This manifesto refers to the word "identity" over 100 times, "unique" over 40 times and "identification" over 10 times. There is reference to "state-issued identity cards", "converts' identity cards", "identification card", "fingerprints", "DNA" etc. Is it not true that only a misanthrope can approve of it?

We submit that the Aadhaar/UID project is going to do almost exactly the same thing which the predecessors of Hitler did, else how is it that Germany always had the lists of Jewish names even prior to the arrival of the Nazis? The Nazis got these lists with the help of IBM which was in the 'census' business that included racial census that entailed not only count the Jews but also identifying them. At the US Holocaust Museum in Washington, DC, there is an exhibit of an IBM Hollerith D-11 card sorting machine that was responsible for organising the census of 1933 that first identified the Jews. Instead of following Hon'ble Court's orders State Governments are unthinkingly compelling Indians to get UID/Aadhaar else face civil death.

We submit that the advertising and public relations blitzkrieg unleashed by biometric identification and surveillance technology vendors have clouded the minds of judicial, political and media fraternity. The dangers of trusting such technological advances for determining social policies will consequent in a situation where "[A] warrant requirement will not make much difference to a society that, under the sway of a naive and discredited theory of genetic determinism, is willing to lock people away on the basis of their genes" among other adverse effects. We submit that this entire issue is about denial of fundamental rights by the emergence of an unlimited government.

We submit that this is open declaration of war against citizens' sensitive personal information like biometric data by transnational entities and governments captured by them paves way for the enslavement of present and future generations through biometric UID/Aadhaar database that lies on cloud beyond Indian jurisdiction. Such initiatives must be stopped and boycotted else it will spread its tentacles in every sphere of life and mobility in the country.

We submit that you should consider inviting testimony from Shri Assange, Shri Snowden and Indian researchers, jurists and relevant current and former scientists who have put their lives at risk to tell Indian government, Indians and others that they are being spied upon by foreign governments, banks and transnational surveillance technology companies for the protection of Indians including present and future Presidents, Prime Ministers, judges, legislators and officials handling sensitive assignments.

We submit that a unanimous resolution of the West Bengal Assembly against UID/Aadhaar number passed on December 2, 2013 in supreme public interest. Pursuant to the West Bengal Assembly Resolution on UID/Aadhaar, West Bengal Chief Minister has issued a statement on March 4, 2017 saying, "In the name of Aadhaar, privacy is being lost and there is extortion. Why is this Govt so negative? As a nation, we must condemn this." Even the opposition party of the State has issued statements expressing grave concern about involvement of questionable foreign agencies in the UID/Aadhaar project.

When questions were raised about this being a defence application of Aadhaar contrary to the initial promise of it being a civilian application Department of Electronics and Information Technology (now Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology), responded stating, "Aadhaar is being used for Biometric Attendance System and this does not form part of Defence application".

The fact is that the application of biometric Unique Identification (UID)/Aadhaar Number was restricted to 'civilian application' and was not meant for defence application. Central Government's Biometrics Standards Committee had categorically stated that UID/Aadhaar's is meant only for "civilian application" but the order on Aadhaar enabled biometric attendance system has been extended to defence employees as well. Now the entire information of the employees working in the department of defence production, which will include related statistics, will be stored online and on cloud will be available to everybody. It cannot be said that application of UID/Aadhaar in the Department of defence production is in national interest becasuse it is making defence employees visible to everyone on the computing cloud.

Government argues, "Attendance of Govt. employees is already being maintained and the Biometric Attendance System, maintained by the attendance.gov.in is just digital equivalent of the age-old attendance register. This is part of contractual relationship between the Public Servant and the Employer, viz. the Government of India, wherein the former has consented to/agreed to the terms of service and is therefore, contractually bound to follow the rules and regulations as specified for him by his/her employer."

It will have us believe that there is no difference between "age-old attendance register" and UID/Aadhaar enabled Biometric Attendance System. Similar arguments have been advanced by the Attorney General in his submission before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. During the course of his submission he contended that Hon'ble Court's employees are also subjected to biometric profiling based attendance implying that the day is not far when judicial officers and judges too will have to do the same. It is noteworthy that citing the Hon'ble Court's orders, the Jammu & Kashmir High Court Bench has stayed a government order regarding the installation of Aadhaar Enabled Biometric System (AEBAS) in government departments to ensure the attendance of employees in their respective departments by its order dated October 4, 2016. This order was passed after the notification of Aadhaar Act, 2016 on September 12, 2016.

In order to comprehend the sophistry involved in averments regarding biometric attendance by Attorney General and Law, Electronics and Information Technology Minister, it is germane to recall the intervention of National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) in the case wherein Indian students in USA were made to wear biometric radio collars. NHRC ensured that the government acted to ensure that the human rights of students are protected. It is germane to note that radio collar is based on biometric data like voice print. If making Indian students wear biometric radio collar constitutes an act which Government of India admitted as an act of violation of human rights, indiscriminate biometric profiling is also an act of violation of human rights. As per Section 2 (G) of Aadhaar Act 2016, "biometric information" means photograph, fingerprint, Iris scan, or any other biological attributes specified by regulations. Thus, it clearly includes biological attributes like voice print and DNA.

If UID/Aadhaar enabled Biometric Attendance System is indeed a "digital equivalent" of "age-old attendance register", why did NHRC and Ministry of External Affairs object to radio collar which can also be argued by sophists to be "digital equivalent". If the "digital equivalent" means biometric equivalent as well then it makes DNA based identity and attendance will also be deemed equivalent to "age-old attendance register". It is quite evident that such is deeply misleading.

There is a logical compulsion for withdrawing the letter and all consequential letters by which UID/Aadhaar is made applicable to defence application i.e. Department of Defence Production in the interest of supreme national security. The coverage of defence employees under Aadhaar enabled Biometric Attendance System implies that it Aadhaar is being put to defence application contrary to government's claims.

With regard to the issue related to national security, in Rajya Sabha, Minister of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) who is responsible for Unique Identification of Authority of India (UIDAI) gave an evasive reply when he was asked a question (Unstarred Question No-2792) on "Misuse of Aadhaar cards and data collected under UID scheme" by Dr KVP Ramachandra Rao. The extremely specific questions were: a) whether it is a fact that a Pakistani spy caught in New Delhi in October carried an Aadhaar card issued in his name? (b) if so, whether the system of issuing Aadhaar cards is faulty or lacks proper supervision; and (c) whether Government is assessing the possibility of misuse of Aadhaar cards and the data collected under the UID scheme?

The minister replied saying, "(a) to (c): UIDAI only issues Aadhaar to the residents of the country. Aadhaar is not a proof of citizenship or nationality." It is a classic example of an irrelevant response from the central government.

In his exemplary performance, the minister added, "The methodology approved for issuance of unique identity for every resident of the country involves use of certain basic demographic information combined with ten finger prints, both irises and photograph to uniquely identify a resident through a process of de-duplication." His reply does not answer query about Pakistani spy caught in New Delhi in October who carried the 12-digit biometric unique identification (UID)/Aadhaar issued in his name.

The minister further said, "The demographic and biometric attributes of residents are collected by various agencies of the Central and the State Governments and others who, in normal course of their activities, interact with the residents. These entities are 'Registrars' of the UIDAI. The information is subsequently uploaded by these agencies to UIDAI where it undergoes a number of quality checks and biometric de-duplication before an Aadhaar is generated." This reply does not explain whether the system of issuing Aadhaar cards is faulty or lacks proper supervision. It maintains studied silence about the role of foreign biometric de-duplication companies.

The minister said, "The verification procedure for demographic data submitted by the resident during enrolment includes supporting documents, introducer system and National Population Register process of public scrutiny. Major portion of the enrolment is document based. There are well defined lists of Proof of Identity (PoI) and Proof of Address (PoA). Under document based enrolment, a resident has to submit any of the PoI/PoA from the said list."

He did not inform the Parliament that the then Chairman of UIDAI has been given ID Limelight Award at the ID WORLD International Congress, 2010 in Milan, Italy on 16th November wherein Safran Morpho (Safran group) was a key sponsor of the ID Congress. Its subsidiary, Sagem Morpho Security Pvt Ltd has been awarded contract for the purchase of Biometric Authentication Devices on February 2, 2011 by the UIDAI. Coincidentally, in 2009 a similar award was given to the head of Pakistan's National Database Registration Authority (NADRA) which successfully implemented a UID/Aadhaar like project, which has been shared with authorities in USA as per cables leaked by Wikileaks.

In such a backdrop, the question raised by Dr KVP Ramachandra Rao in Rajya Sabha about biometric Aadhaar issued to a Pakistani spy remains quite relevant from the point of national security.

It may be recalled that on July 30, 2010, in a joint press release, it was announced that "the Mahindra Satyam and Morpho led consortium has been selected as one of the key partners to implement and deliver the Aadhaar program by UIDAI (Unique Identification Authority of India)." This means that at least two contracts have been awarded to the French conglomerate led consortium. Is it a coincidence that Morpho (Safran group) sponsored the award to Chairman, UIDAI and the former got a contract from the latter?

It is apparent that UIDAI Chief has been given the award "For being the force behind a transformational project ID project in India...and "to provide identification cards for each resident across the country and would be used primarily as the basis for efficient delivery of welfare services. It would also act as a tool for effective monitoring of various programs and schemes of the government."

It may also be noted that UIDAI awarded contracts to three companies namely, Satyam Computer Services Ltd (Mahindra Satyam), as part of a "Morpho led consortium", L-1 Identity Solutions Operating Company and Accenture Services Pvt Ltd of US for the "Implementation of Biometric Solution for UIDAI" on July 30, 2010. Notably, L1 which had signed the contract agreement as a US based company (subject to USA's Patriot Act) has been bought over by Safran Group after US Government's national security clearance.

In his reply the minister claimed that "There are well defined processes and guidelines of Aadhaar enrolment that the Registrars and Enrolment Agencies are bound to follow. A proper deterring mechanism is in place discouraging any deviation from these laid down processes and guidelines. The complete trail of each and every enrolment is maintained. There is provision for concurrent evaluation of the Enrolment Centres." If that is indeed the case it must be revealed as to who allowed the provision of personal sensitive data of Indian residents to remain with the above mentioned foreign companies in the contract agreement compromising present and future national security.

In his reply the minister also claimed that "Aadhaar is generated after a number of quality checks and biometric de-duplication. Every attempt is made to ensure that fake/bogus enrolments are identified through quality checks and biometric de-duplication process, and rejected. In a miniscule number of cases, where an ineligible enrolment may slip through, there are provisions for taking action against the delinquent operator/supervisor/enrolment agency; financial penalties; and criminal proceedings by lodging of FIR, besides cancellation of such Aadhaars." This claim is factually incorrect.

The making of CIDR is contrary to the principle of decentralisation in cybersecurity. Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 (18 of 2016) lists breaking into CIDR as an offence but this law criminalises a technological impossibility. In a bizarre act, it provides that only UIDAI can file a complaint when the data of a resident of India is misused or abused instead of the victim of abuse.

As per Section 47, "Courts will take cognisance of offences under this Act only upon complaint being made by the UIDAI or any officer authorised by it." This deprives the victim of a right to file complaint although Section 34 of the Act provides that "Impersonating or attempting to impersonate another person by providing false demographic or biometric information will be punishable by imprisonment of up to three years, and/or fine of up to ten thousand rupees." Victims cannot file complaint even when someone changes or attempts to change any demographic or biometric information of an Aadhaar number holder by impersonating another person (or attempting to do so), with the intent of i) causing harm or mischief to an Aadhaar number holder, or ii) appropriating the identity of an Aadhaar number holder although it is punishable under Section 35.

Victims of abuse cannot file complaint in cases wherein collection of identity information is done by one not authorised by this Act, by way of pretending otherwise despite the fact that the Act makes it punishable under Section 36. Unless authorised by UIDAI or any officer authorised by it, victims cannot file complaint even when there is "Intentional disclosure or dissemination of identity information, to any person not authorised under this Act, or in violation of any agreement entered into under this Act" under Section 37 although it is punishable.
Unless authorised by the UIDAI, the intentional acts like accessing or securing access to the CIDR; downloading, copying or extracting any data from the CIDR; introducing or causing any virus or other contaminant into the CIDR; damaging or causing damage to the data in the CIDR; disrupting or causing disruption to access to CIDR; causing denial of access to an authorised to the CIDR; revealing information in breach of (D) in Section 28, or Section 29; destruction, deletion or alteration of any files in the CIDR; stealing, destruction, concealment or alteration of any source code used by the UIDAI , will be punishable under Section 38.

Even in such cases victims cannot file complaint without authorisation by UIDAI.

Section 39 of the Act reads, "Tampering of data in the CIDR or removable storage medium, with the intention to modify or discover information relating to Aadhaar number holder will be punishable". Thus, it admits that such acts are possible and imminent but the Act does not empower the victims of such tampering or removal instead it empowers UIDAI.

While Section 40 makes "Use of identity information in violation of Section 8 (3) by a requesting entity will be punishable with imprisonment up to three years and/or a fine up to ten thousand rupees (in case of an individual), and fine up to one lakh rupees (in case of a company)", it is incomprehensible as to how a company or an individual feel deterred by such meager punishment when they can harvest big database of personal sensitive information which is admittedly a "national asset" and "rich asset".

Section 43 of the Act visualise a situation wherein offences can be committed by a Company but they can be excused "if they can prove lack of knowledge of the offense or that they had exercised all due diligence to prevent it." It also underlines the possibility of an offence committed by a Company with the consent, connivance or neglect of a director, manager, secretary or other officer of a company but they too can be excused if they can prove their ignorance, inability and inevitability.

In a stark admission of the involvement of foreign locations and persons, Section 44 states that the Act "will also apply to offences committed outside of India by any person, irrespective of their nationality, if the offence involves any data in the CIDR." This is akin to what is happening in the case of Union Carbide Corporation, subsidiary of Dow Chemicals Company whose case is going in a Bhopal Court for the offences committed outside of India related to its Bhopal based pesticide plant. The offences include decisions taken by it about not providing for safety in the plant. Dow has refused to appear before the Court despite repeated orders of the Court. How can the situation be different when CIDR database is compromised endangering national security?
These provisions underline the possibility of abuse and misuse of sensitive data of defence employees in particular and citizens in general by foreign entities as well.

It is possible that such civilian and non-civilian applications are being bulldozed by some commercial entities in order to store and read biometric and DNA script of Indian population in the aftermath of the sequencing of Human Genome for epigenetics, medicine, big data, social control, inheritance, eugenics and genetic determinism. Under the tremendous influence and unprecedented onslaught from unregulated and ungovernable technology companies, so far Central Government and State Governments have failed to safeguard national security and citizens' liberty which is part of right to life. In such a context, it is germane to ponder over the question about issuance of UID/Aadhaar to Pakistani spy caught in New Delhi. Who exactly is behind denial of exact reply to the question? Is there any reason to assume that other foreign nationals have not intruded the system like the spy in question?

UID/Aadhaar is akin to a piece of collar which the transnational powers want to tie on the neck of present and future Indian citizens. Government has allowed itself to be misled and it has failed to protect personal sensitive information which has already gone to foreign companies and continues to flow in foreign direction. While countries like China, USA, UK, France, Germany, Phillipines and Australia have secured themselves by abandoning their UID project, India is following the path of Pakistan which has compromised its national security and citizens' personal sensitive information through National Database Registration Authority (NADRA). It is now up to the Supreme Court to set matters right before the neglected spark burns the house learning from the smoke in the neighborhood.

In view of the above, we solemnly and earnestly appeal to you to save the present and future citizens from unlimited government, genocide, holocaust and foreign aggression in supreme national interest. Your urgent intervention will create compelling logic for extraordinary patriotic steps which can set a healthy precedent for all times to come.

We will be happy to meet you as a delegation in this regard. A detailed note is attached to underline its connection with other initiatives which has not been disclosed so far.

Thanking you in anticipation.

Yours Sincerely
Dr Gopal Krishna, Member, Citizens Forum for Civil Liberties (CFCL)
Mb: 9818089660, 08227816731
E-mail: 1715krishna@gmail.com

Web: www.toxicswatch.org

Frontier
Autumn Number
Vol. 50, No.12-15, Sep 24 - Oct 21, 2017